Key Points

• Evidenced by communication failures that nearly ended in Trump’s assassination, joint security arrangements can result in security gaps unless coordination and alignment are frequently reviewed.

• A case study from a large university that is serviced by several security entities reveals the potential for mistrust, inefficiency, cultural challenges, inconsistencies, and confusion among the population served.

• Alignment in complex security arrangements can be improved through developing a common vision, practice standardization, joint training initiatives, and communication with community stakeholders.

Disconnect Between Secret Service and Police at Fault in Trump Assassination Attempt

The timeline in the recent Trump assassination attempt reveals critical communication failures that allowed a shooter to nearly kill the former US President.

A 6:02 p.m., Trump took the stage to begin his regular rally speech—more than 40 minutes after local law enforcement had taken notice of a suspect individual with a backpack and a range finder and radioed their concerns.

At 6:09 p.m., spectators began yelling to police officers, alerting them that an armed man was on the roof of a nearby building. A local police officer climbed to the roof but fell to the ground when the shooter turned toward him, and an officer radioed that he spotted a man with a gun. Nearly a minute later, the gunman fired the eight shots that killed one individual, wounded several others, and nearly killed the Republican nominee for President.

The security failure sparked multiple questions, including why Trump was allowed to take the stage to deliver his regular rally speech when a suspicious person had been identified and was unaccounted for. Also, why was Trump not hurried off the stage, even after an officer had confronted the shooter and a warning about him went out on the radio?

Information conveyed on the police radio call never made it to Secret Service agents because they were operating from a different command post than local police and were not on the same radio channel, it was revealed in a joint hearing of the Senate Judiciary and Homeland Security committees investigating the security missteps.

“It appears that that information was stuck or siloed in that local channel.” — Ronald Rowe, Acting Director, U.S. Secret Service

Acting Secret Service Ronald Rowe Jr. acknowledged the communication failure and said the event would cause the agency to "re-evaluate where we put our security rooms. If a state or local [authority] sets up a unified command post, maybe we need to be in that room as well."

Several security experts have publicly criticized the lack of coordination, including Steve Georgas, former deputy chief of the Chicago Police Department who worked on hundreds of joint assignments with the Secret Service. According to Georgas, putting local officers and Secret Service agents together in one location is “extremely vital” to close communication gaps and ensure every radio frequency would be monitored in a joint command center.

Case Study: Good Standalone Security Organizations Are Not Sufficient

Security is never easy, but managing protection is more straightforward when oversight of the function resides within a single department in a single entity. Often, however, the typical security organization flow chart doesn’t apply. In many campus environments, sworn officers and non-sworn officers, or contract security personnel, proprietary security employees, and police work in the same environment.

It is possible to enhance protection when distinct security organizations work separately but in close alignment, but coordination is not always easy. Problems may arise—even among independently effective security organizations. Problems can include:

• lack of coordination,

• misunderstanding of roles and responsibilities,

• confusion over the population being served,

• mistrust, and

• absence of a shared vision.

These common barriers to a positive overall security culture existed a while back at the University of Michigan, where security for the University community is administered through several distinct security organizations: the Hospitals & Health Centers Security Department (HHC Security, non-sworn security officers), the Housing Security Department (HSC, non-sworn), and the Department of Public Safety (DPS, sworn campus police officers).

Despite extremely positive perceptions of each security organization individually, an independent review found a problematic security environment, the result of how the security organizations interacted.

“The three departments are well-run, professional and efficient,” read the consultant’s report. Yet, “There is no formal and insufficient informal connection between the three resulting in significant lack of coordination.” (University of Michigan Cultural Assessment/Benchmarking Study, Margolis Healy). Some examples of problems uncovered:

1. Separate reporting lines among the three directors of security contributed to inefficiency, cultural challenges, and created a lack of consistency about the directors’ performance expectations.

2. All three security organizations used a “Public Safety” moniker, which caused confusion among students, faculty, staff, patients, visitors, and guests. For example, people seeking help often thought they were speaking or calling a DPS police officer when they were actually dealing with a HHC or HSC security officer, which frequently resulted in unrealistic service expectations that often went unmet.

3. Interviewees revealed a culture of fear and blame between the three security organizations. “The lack of a healthy working relationship between the three organizations contributed to confusion, misunderstanding, miscommunication, a lack of trust and respect, a lack of sharing of information, and a failure to recognize and appreciate the role, duties and responsibilities that each department must perform.” One interviewee, for example, said police did not respect the role of healthcare security officers and often ignored healthcare regulations.

Improving Alignment in Complex Protection Arrangements

Enhancing coordination among different security entities is critical to forge a singular security culture from distinct parts. Recommendations made to the University of Michigan are worth considering any time a community is served by multiple security entities.

1. Create a shared vision through common leadership. One way to accomplish this goal is by changing the organizational structure whereby different security departments are unified by reporting to a common executive director.

2. Develop a unified standard practice guide. To put it in sports terminology, even if different security organizations have their own coach, they should all work off the same playbook. A standard practice guide helps to improve communication among security organizations as well as helping to enhance trust and respect. Topic areas in which it is important to create a common standard and to clarify inter-organizational roles and responsibilities, include:

• Policies & Procedures (e.g., crime/ incident reporting and investigations; recruitment, selection and hiring; shared resources; emergency management).

• Technology (e.g., assessment, integration, and funding of shared security technology).

• Training (e.g., regular, and on-going joint training opportunities on topics of mutual importance; legal requirements).

3. Develop a brand management strategy. In addition to improving operational coordination, attention should also be paid to the perception of individuals who are the recipients of protection. A brand management strategy can help correct misinformation, miscommunication, and misalignment of community expectations in seeking public safety services. A strategy can highlight each security organization’s unique service to their specific communities while also communicating the overarching mission to safeguard people and property. Features that could be considered in a strategy are design standards for uniforms, logos, publications, and signage.

Finally, frequent meetings between leaders of the different security organizations—both formal and informal—are important to keep the different divisions on the same page, share concerns and best practices, and discuss policy and procedural issues. Leaders should meet informally weekly or bi-weekly for coffee or lunch and bi-weekly as part of operation staff meetings, according to recommendations made to the University of Michigan.